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Introduction
Lebanon received its one-millionth refugee from Syria on April 3rd, 
an event that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the UN’s refugee agency, called a “devastating mile-
stone.”1 Unfortunately, markers such as these only show the distance 
travelled but not how far is left to go. This one was quickly passed 
and there is still no end in sight. In the eight weeks following that 
announcement another 90,538 Syrians made their way to Lebanon 
in order to escape the fighting that rages on in Syria.2 With 1,090,538 
Syrian refugees now on its territory, undoubtedly even more given 
the time it took for this article to come to print, Lebanon is home to 
nearly 40% of the 2.84 million Syrians now living in neighbouring 
countries (see figure 1a). It has accepted an average of 53,000 people 
each month for the past 12 months (see figure 1b), resulting in an 
incredible 25% population increase since fighting began three years 
ago. Without greater sharing of the human as well as the financial 
burden by rich world countries, Lebanon is at risk of paying the price 
for its hospitality with severe political and economic destabilisation. 
Several factors have facilitated the flow of Syrians into Lebanon, the 
first and most obvious being that Lebanon has maintained largely 
open borders throughout the crisis while Syria’s other neighbours 
have increasingly restricted crossings since the beginning of 2013. 
This has made the route to Lebanon the path of least resistance for 
many of those fleeing the violence. Another important factor is that 
many Syrians lived in Lebanon before the conflict began. This pre-
crisis population, which has existed since the 1950s and were esti-
mated to number around 500,000 in 2011, are part of the many fam-
ily, political, and business networks that span the Lebanese-Syrian 
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border and that facilitate refugees’ access to Leba-
nese soil. Many of these long-established Syrians are, 
at least initially, able to offer some semblance of shel-
ter, local knowledge, and logistical help to new arriv-
als. As one report from Swiss Peace argues, “Current 
migration patterns of refugees from Syria are not 
random but based on confessional [religious/sectar-
ian] and social ties that coincide with political sym-
pathies and result in (perceived) social and physical 
safety provided by affiliated clans and communi-
ties.”3 As discussed later on in this brief, this chan-
nelling of refugees to certain places based on their 
socio-religious profiles has consequences for the 
Lebanese political system and greatly increases the 
destabilising potential of the current refugee flow.
Many of these same areas also rank as some of the 
poorest parts of Lebanon. More than a quarter 
(28.5%) of Lebanon’s population lived under the 
national poverty line of €2.89 per day (US$4/day) 
in 2007 (the most recent data available).5 As can be 
clearly seen from the table below, the areas most 
afflicted by poverty – i.e. the North, Bekaa and 
Mount Lebanon, and to a lesser extent the south — 
are also the areas with the highest numbers of ref-
ugees. Together, the North, the Bekaa, and Mount 
Lebanon accounted for both 78% of Lebanese living 
below the poverty line prior to the crisis (around 
987,000 people), and 85% of registered Syrian ref-
ugees currently in Lebanon (800,000+ people). In 
short, the population most vulnerable to any shock 
is being asked to give the most.
The Strain on Local Communities
One remarkable characteristic of the present crisis is 
that, across the region, only a small portion of refu-
gees live in camps. Lebanon is unique however, in 
that the government has so far refused to establish 
any formal refugee camps. Although the number 
of informal tented settlements is on the rise – UN-
HCR reported in March that some 15% of refugees, 
around 155,000 people, are now living in close to 
1000 such settlements – the vast majority of refugees 
in Lebanon are dispersed across some 1600 com-
munities.4 These localities are unevenly distributed 
Source: UNHCR
Figure 1a: Syrian refugees registered to UNHCR in Neighbouring countries (January 2012-May 2014)
3 ■  One million Syrians in Lebanon: A milestone quickly passed
geographically, with refugees primarily concentrated 
in the North; the Bekaa in the centre-east; the centre 
band of Mount Lebanon between Beirut and Zahle; 
and the south-west area stretching from Beirut down 
to Sour, near the Israeli border (see map).
The strain on these communities is obvious regard-
less of the metric used. Employment, education, 
healthcare, housing, sanitation, physical infrastruc-
ture, or living costs: all have experienced spikes that 
have severely reduced already insufficient capacity. 
The World Bank estimated last September that by 
the start of 2014, Lebanon’s national average elec-
tricity delivery would be cut from 18.3 hours per 
day to 16.5 hours per day (a 10% reduction), and 
in rural areas power might only be delivered 50% of 
the time.6 To give another example, Syrian refugees 
were already accounting for 40% of primary health-
care visits in December 2012, when there were only 
around 130,000 refugees in country (around 12% of 
the current total).7 Shortages are endemic, raising 
costs of medicines and supplies, and patients – both 
Syrian and Lebanese – must often wait a long time to 
Source: UNHCR
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Figure 1b: New refugees registrations with UNHCR per month – Lebanon (January 2012-May 2014)
Map 1: Lebanon with areas of refugeeconcentration 
shaded in blue
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be seen. The World Bank and others have reported 
that one consequence of this has been that local 
residents are often travelling further and incurring 
additional costs to reach less-used healthcare facilities.8
Costs for rent and provisions have risen substantially 
in areas of high refugee density. As rents have risen, 
evictions have become increasingly common.9 This 
is, in part, because rent inflation has priced many of 
the poorest out of the market. It is also due to the 
fact that refugee families are often more willing than 
local Lebanese to pool resources and live together 
under one roof. In such cases a group of refugees 
is often able pay more rent in absolute terms than a 
single Lebanese or Syrian family.10
At the same time, refugees looking for work have 
severely depressed wages for daily labour.11 Refu-
gees and the residents of many rural communities 
both tend to work in the agricultural and construc-
tion sectors, and thus are often in direct competition 
for scarce jobs. The Food and Agriculture Organisa-
tion of the UN reported last year that some areas of 
Lebanon had seen up to a 60% decrease in the wage 
rate for day labour.12 The World Bank estimated 
that, “by end–2014, some 170,000 additional Leba-
nese will be pushed into poverty. … An additional 
220,000–324,000 Lebanese are expected to become 
unemployed … most of them unskilled youth which 
would about double the unemployment rate, to over 
20 percent.”13 Furthermore, local municipalities, 
which are responsible for many aspects of service 
delivery, are not able to keep up with the increased 
demand for such basics as water and sanitation.
These dynamics have led to an increase in tensions 
between refugees and the inhabitants of host com-
munities in some areas. A report released in March 
2014 from the Norwegian Refugee Council corrob-
orates claims made elsewhere that some refugees, 
especially those with irregular legal status, have 
been the target of harassment and violence.14 Such 
instances of animosity are often attributed to the 
perception of some local residents, many of whom 
face some of the same structural constraints as ref-
ugees, that Syrian refugees unfairly benefit from 
humanitarian aid while dragging down the living 
conditions and employment prospects of local resi-
dents. It is important to stress that to an extent this is 
only perception. The International Labour Organi-
sation reported that Lebanese workers in the Bekaa 
still earn around double their Syrian counterparts, 
albeit still below the official minimum wage,15 and 
Table 1: Poverty and Refugee Distribution Across Lebanon’s Governorates
Governorate
Percentage of 
Lebanon’s Poor in 
Governorate  
(2007 data)
Percentage of 
Governorate’s 
Population that is 
Poor (2007 data)
No. of registered 
S. Refugees in 
Governorate 
(as of May 2014)
Percentage of total 
registered S. Refugee 
Population in 
Governorate  
(as of May 2014)
Bekaa 13.0% 12.7% 339,539 35.9%
North 38.0% 20.7% 266,865 28.2%
Mount Lebanon 27.3% 39.9% 236,593 25.0%
South 15.6% 10.5% 77,831 8.2%
Nabatieh 4.0% 5.9% 45,818 4.8%
Beirut 2.1% 10.4% 28,575 3.0%
Source: Columns 1 & 2: International Poverty Centre. 2008; Column 3: UNHCR; Column 4: calculated, based on a total of 995,221 
registered refugees.
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no reports have claimed that Lebanese are starting to 
live in construction sites and informal camps. Nev-
ertheless, such perceptions are widely reported to 
have negatively impacted refugee-community rela-
tions. Thus, as much as it is true that many refugees 
continue to benefit from Lebanese hospitality and 
generosity, it is also a fact that the cracks in social 
solidarity are deepening. In Lebanon, such cracks 
do not run across the surface of a solid founda-
tion but threaten to seriously undermine its already 
weak political system.
A Fractured Political Context
Lebanon’s central state is weak and dysfunctional. 
As a case in point, it only acknowledged that a ref-
ugee problem existed and required a government 
response in December 2012, more than 1.5 years 
after the start of the conflict. Its initial response was 
stillborn however, as several months later Prime 
Minister Najib Mikati resigned and the government 
collapsed with the nascent plan still unfunded.16 A 
new government returned to work in April 2014 
after a year’s absence. Amidst these events the 
State administration managed to request an impact 
assessment from the World Bank, which was deliv-
ered in September 2013, and finally published a 
24-page roadmap of stabilisation measures in mid-
November 2013. Drawing heavily on the recom-
mendations of the World Bank’s impact assessment, 
it reportedly provides a multi-tier programme 
for returning the levels of public service delivery, 
employment and private investment to pre-crisis 
status, as well as several projects for ‘strengthening 
social cohesion.’17 By all accounts the Lebanese state 
has done little to implement this plan to date.
The Lebanese government operates in parallel with 
myriad private, quasi-state and extra-state actors. 
The most notable of these is Hezbollah, the Iranian- 
and Syrian regime-backed, Shi’ite resistance move-
ment-cum-political party, cum-state-within-a-state 
that simultaneously stands in parliament and rivals 
the government and military in terms of power and 
ability. The country’s politics is further fractured 
by its deeply sectarian system, with power distrib-
uted in state institutions on a confessional [religious 
affiliation] basis and most non-state political actors 
organised along confessional lines. Religious, polit-
ical and kinship/community identities thus overlap 
to a great extent in Lebanon, and while it is incor-
rect to reduce Lebanese politics to religious affilia-
tion it is equally impossible to understand it without 
including the religious and sectarian dimensions.
In this context, the entrance of the Syrian refugees 
has the potential to greatly destabilise Lebanon’s 
politics because it alters the relative populations of 
Lebanon’s confessional groups. The vast majority 
of refugees are Sunni and they have migrated to 
communities that share that religious/community 
identity. This increases the demographic weight of 
Sunnis, unofficially the 3rd largest confessional group 
in Lebanon today, both at the national level and in 
certain regions. As previously noted, political power 
in Lebanon is distributed on a confessional basis. 
This demographic shift thus directly threatens the 
clout wielded by the political actors of other confes-
sional groups, most notably in this case Hezbollah.
Lebanon’s history is also deeply entwined with Syr-
ia’s, not least because the latter occupied the former 
for nearly three decades, starting in 1976. Leba-
non’s current leaders, many of whom were active in 
the Lebanese civil war, thus grew up in relation to 
Syria and maintain either a cooperative or antago-
nistic stance toward their more powerful neighbour. 
When Syrian tanks finally withdrew in 2005, Leba-
non’s political factions fell into two camps: the pro-
Syrian ‘March 8th’ coalition headed by Hezbollah on 
one side of the fence, and the anti-Syrian ‘March 
14th’ coalition headed by Saad Hariri’s Future Move-
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ment on the other. Their conflicting stances over 
Syria have paralysed much of the government’s 
decision-making capability, and its internal divi-
sions have only become more stark as the war in 
Syria has spread and the refugee crisis worsened. 
Factions that not only oppose each other over Syria, 
but often fight each other within Syria, have now 
opened Lebanon up as a second theatre of war.
The violence destabilising Lebanon today has esca-
lated in parallel with Hezbollah’s increasingly open 
support for the Syrian regime. The group was ini-
tially coy about its involvement across the border, 
however that changed in April 2013 when Hez-
bollah announced its direct cooperation with the 
Syrian military in an assault on a rebel stronghold at 
al-Qusayr, Syria.18 Since then both Sunni extremist 
and Syrian rebel groups have promised reprisals 
against Hezbollah, its patrons, and Shi’ite civil-
ians, its assumed supporters.19 Lebanon has suf-
fered 13 car and suicide bombings since the battle 
of al-Qusayr, 11 of which targeted Hezbollah or 
Shi’ite neighbourhoods and were claimed by Sunni 
extremist groups (see box). This retribution has not, 
however, slowed the pace with which Hezbollah has 
deepened its involvement in the fighting. Over the 
past year it has fought in several major Syrian cities, 
including Damascus, Homs, Aleppo, and Deraa.20 
It is spurred on by the rise of a particular type of 
Sunni extremism in the region, specifically takfiri 
groups that see Shi’ites as infidels, and the challenge 
to Bashar Al-Asad, Hezbollah’s patron in Damascus. 
The Hezbollah leadership, according to a report by 
the International Crisis Group, sees both of these 
factors as existential threats to its organisation.21 
Thus, Syrian refugees are also able to destabilise the 
situation by joining the fight against Hezbollah on 
Lebanese soil. Not only are most refugees Sunni, but 
many have links with the Syrian opposition forces. 
At times militants who have faced off against Hez-
bollah in the field are directly mixed in with refugee 
flows, such as when Hezbollah forces helped storm 
Yabroud, Syria last March and fighters as well as 
civilians fled to the Lebanese city of Arsal.22 There 
have also been reports of militant groups recruiting 
from among Lebanon’s refugee populations. Thus it 
is possible that some of those who fled have seen an 
opportunity to strike back at Hezbollah on its home 
turf. Today the northern border regions remain 
extremely unstable, with occurrences of cross-
border shelling of Lebanese villages by the Syrian 
regime, inter-factional fighting, and a near complete 
lack of Lebanese state presence.
Dealing with Danger on  
Europe’s Doorstep
European and other rich world countries must do 
more to help Lebanon cope with the on-going crisis 
or they risk watching the situation there spiral fur-
ther out of control. Sectarian tensions easily run 
high in Lebanon, and its political stability is, for the 
moment, still predicated on maintaining the delicate 
balance of power that exists between different con-
fessional groups. With (Shi’ite) Hezbollah openly 
fighting alongside the Syrian regime, Sunni extrem-
ists retaliating against Hezbollah’s actions on Leba-
nese territory, and a refugee population reaching 
1.1 million, the pressure on the country is reaching 
new heights. If it reached the boiling point not only 
would Lebanon burn, reason enough to ease the 
strain, but the ensuing conflict would produce and 
galvanise militants and extremists on all sides. This 
would further destabilise the region and constitute 
a new threat to the security of the European neigh-
bourhood.
The European Union and other countries can help 
try to prevent such a tragedy in many ways. It must 
increase its already laudable financial support for 
humanitarian relief efforts. As of May 16th, EU 
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9 July 2013 – Beirut
0 dead, 50 injured in Beirut’s Shi’ite Dahiyeh suburbs
Unclaimed
15 August 2013 – Beirut
21 dead, 250 injured in Beirut’s Shi’ite Dahiyeh suburbs
Claimed by Brigade of Aisha, the Mother of the Faithful
23 August 2013 – Tripoli
35 dead, 500+ injured outside two Sunni mosques
Unclaimed, Hezbollah suspected
19 November 2013 – Beirut
23 dead, 146 injured outside the Iranian Embassy
Claimed by the Abdullah Azzam Brigades
27 December 2013 – Beirut
6 dead, including Lebanon’s anti-Syrian former finance 
minister Mohamed Chatah, and 71 injured
Unclaimed, Hezbollah and Syrian Regime suspected
2 January 2014 – Beirut
4 dead, 77 injured in Beirut’s Shi’ite Dahiyeh suburbs
Claimed by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
16 January 2014 – Hermel
5 dead, 42 injured near Hermel’s government building
Claimed by Nusra Front of Lebanon
21 January 2014 – Beirut
4 killed, 50 injured in Beirut’s Shi’ite Dahiyeh suburbs
Claimed by Nusra Front of Lebanon
1 February 2014 – Hermel
4 dead, 23 injured at a petrol station
Claimed by Nusra Front of Lebanon
19 February 2014 – Beirut
6 dead, 129 injured near the Iranian Cultural Centre
Claimed by the Abdullah Azzam Brigades
22 February 2014 – Hermel
3 dead, 17 injured at a military checkpoint
Claimed by Nusra Front of Lebanon
16 March 2014 – Nabi Othman (Bekaa Valley) 
2–4 dead, including a local Hezbullah leader, and 14 
injured
Contesting claims by the Free Sunnis of Baalbek Brigade 
and Nusra Front of Lebanon
29 March 2014 – Arsal
3 dead, 4 injured at a military checkpoint
Claimed by the Free Sunnis of Baalbek Brigade
 
— Compiled from news reports
Blood in the streets
Lebanon has experienced a rash of car and suicide bombings since July 2013. These attacks, 11 of 
which targeted Hezbollah, Iran, or Shi’ite neighbourhoods and were claimed by some of the many 
Sunni militant groups operating on Lebanese soil today, were likely prompted by Hezbollah’s 
increasingly open cooperation with the Syrian regime against Syrian opposition forces.
member states had contributed over €1.24 billion to 
the region since 2011 and another €1.3 billion had 
been donated from EU communal funds.23 Unfor-
tunately, the scale of the crisis demands even more 
than that. Last year’s UNHCR funding appeal was 
only partially met, with donations totalling €1.53 
of €2.15 billion (71% of the amount requested) by 
the end of 2013.24 This year’s much bigger appeal 
for €3.13 billion has so far been 27% funded. Some 
€1.26 billion of this has been earmarked for pro-
grammes in Lebanon, but to date UNHCR has only 
received €276 million (22%) for Lebanon-specific 
works.25 More must be given. 
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When drafting the cheques, however, donor coun-
tries should not only send their euros to interna-
tional organisations. The Lebanese central state, as 
weak as it is, has not inspired confidence in inter-
national donors and has been effectively sidelined 
in the world’s response to the crisis.26 However, as 
the report from Swiss Peace argued, “sustaining the 
availability of local community capacities will be a 
key resource to cope with future refugee needs.”27 
Municipalities, which are the front-line govern-
mental service providers, are in desperate need of 
funds to maintain basic functions. Direct infusions 
to local governments as well as Lebanese NGOs 
have the potential to relieve some of the rising ten-
sions between refugees and host communities, as 
well as dispel resentment among those who feel ref-
ugees receive preferential treatment from the inter-
national community.
European Member States must also open their 
doors further to Syrian refugees to lessen the human 
strain on Syria’s neighbours. While Lebanon has 
received more than one million refugees, the EU’s 
28 member states have accepted 41,695 of 69,740 
asylum requests from Syrian refugees since the 
start of the crisis in March 2011 to December 2013 
(the remaining cases are pending). There are unfor-
tunately few signs of hope that such attitudes will 
soon change. As of December 2013, EU countries 
had pledged a mere 12,340 resettlement spots to last 
year’s UNHCR initiative, only 40% of the requested 
30,000, itself a very small number.28 The rich world 
cannot dodge its responsibility to the people of Syria 
by pointing to the size of its humanitarian contribu-
tions. It is the human pressure on Lebanon’s labour 
markets and infrastructure, as much as it is the 
poverty of refugees and host communities, that is 
threatening to tip the scales.
Finally, and most importantly, both international 
actors and the Lebanese government must fully 
understand that this will be a protracted refugee 
crisis. It is fantasy to assume that over a million 
people will leave Lebanon and return to Syria in 
the near future. Thus, while funding is still needed 
for immediate relief, planning must turn from a 
humanitarian to a developmental mind set. How 
can jobs be created, housing and infrastructure sys-
tems improved, and political systems adapted to 
successfully and durably absorb a large portion of 
the Syrian refugees currently in Lebanon without 
harming the Lebanese? These questions must be 
answered, or Lebanon risks layering a second ref-
ugee population on top of its resident Palestinians. 
This latter group has now been in the country for 65 
years, yet still faces many problems with residency, 
employment, and access to government services. It 
is in no one’s interest to see what has happened to 
the Palestinians of Lebanon happen again.
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